Trust is a dynamic and complex phenomenon and understanding the factors which affect its formation, evolution and disappearance is a critical research issue. It has been shown that trust plays a key role in how human and social capital develop, how economies grow and how societies progress. In this paper, we present an agent-based model of the relations between a dynamic effort allocation system, an evolving trust framework and a reputation module to study how changes in micro-level rent-seeking traits and decisions can shape the emergence of trust across the simulated environment. According to our results, variations in trust are correlated more with the returns to being productive, rather than rent-seeking. In line with previous studies, our model shows that higher than average levels of risk-taking by agents lead to further trust and gains during an interaction, though taken to an extreme, both trust and gain can decline as a result of reckless decisions. We also report on the formation of trust clusters in our model as an emergent phenomenon.
Introduction
Research on the role of trust in economies and its relationships to trade and institutions has flourished in recent years. Early work included Janet Landa's studies of ethnic trading networks (1981; 1994) and Avner Greif's (1989; 1993) research on Maghribi traders in medieval times. Francis Fukuyama (1995) brought the academic discussion on the relationship between trust and economic development to a wider audience with his book Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity (insightfully reviewed by Quddus et al. 2000) .
As Labonne and Chase (2010) observed, it is now well established that higher levels of trust in a society are associated with higher economic growth rates (Knack and Keefer 1997; Zak and Knack 2001 ), higher quality and less corrupt institutions (Porta et al. 1997; Uslaner, 2002) and better public goods (Ostrom 2000; Ostrom and Walker 2003) .
Using data from the Philippines for example, Labonne and Chase (2010) showed that lowering transaction costs by making connections easier, in this case through road building, led to an increase in generalized trust. They also highlighted the frequently overlooked endogeneity of trust: It is not simply that high trust environments lead to growth, but that growth itself can make possible investments in public goods such as roads, which themselves lower transaction costs even further, thereby fostering a further increase in trust.
Research into trust now encompasses a wide variety of fields, including, for example, the role of trust in international relations (Kydd 2005) , in the international climate regime (Vogler 2010 ), in energy policy (Kydd 2010) , in shaping institutions (Wang & Gordon 2011) , in informal borrowing networks (Karlan et al. 2009 ), in humanitarian logistics (Tatham and Kovács 2010) , in human development (Özcan and Bjørnskov 2011) , in the relationship between culture and development (Breuer and McDermott 2012) , and in experimental economics (Johnson and Mislin 2011) .
In this paper, we focus on one particular aspect of the role of trust in economic exchange, namely the relations between trust and rent-seeking, which to our knowledge has not been studied so far. More specifically, we want to investigate how rent-seeking behaviors of individuals and their mutual trust at the micro-level can result in different rates of economic growth -as, for example, when they come together for a particular project to produce a common product. Rent-seeking behavior during such collaborative projects may include effort allocated to activities such as lobbying and bribing which, while they are likely to increase the resource allocation returns for the rent-seeker himself, are considered a waste of resources and an unproductive allocation when each contract is considered or the economy is considered as a whole (Krueger 1974; Tollison 1982; Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny 1993) .
To model the rent-seeking decisions and behaviors of the individuals, here, each agent's trust toward the counterparty to an interaction is coupled with the economic theory of effort allocation whereby economic agents can allocate their resources either to productive or to unproductive activities (e.g. Bhagwati 1982; Baumol 1990 ). This theory has been widely used to analyze social behaviors especially in the field of rent-seeking and economic conflicts (Hausken 2005) . The dynamics of model in which agents can allocate effort between different options, as discussed later in the paper, depend not only on each of the players individually and the sum of their individual decisions and actions, but are also associated with complex mutual strategic decisions of individuals about their trust and rent-seeking decisions. We have therefore employed an agent-based computational model to study this complex phenomenon.
Trust has been studied extensively in computational models (Sabater and Sierra 2005) , including multi-agent systems (Ramchurn et al. 2004) . More recently, models of trust have also featured in the agent-based modeling literature including by and an important exercise in replicating a previously published model of trust, cooperation and market formation in the U.S. and Japan (Macy & Sato 2002 , 2008 Will & Hegselmann 2008a , 2008b ).
Considering the literature discussed above, the main contribution of this study is the development of an agent-based model which is capable of linking individual rent-seeking decisions and risk attitudes and micro-level interaction outcomes with both micro-and macro-level social (trust) and economic (gain) concepts through a dynamic social network and a reputation module. The model is introduced in the next section, followed by analyses of how changes in micro-motives can result in the emergence of new forms of macro-behavior.
The Model
The model is presented using the updated version of the ODD protocol (Grimm, et al 2010) where first the model's building blocks are introduced in the overview section, followed by its design concepts and details. The ODD protocol has been used to facilitate possible replications or extensions. In some parts the order of titles recommended by the protocol has been changed to match the model conditions. The model was implemented using NetLogo 4.1 (Wilensky 1999) .
Purpose
The purpose of this model is to investigate how directly unproductive activities such a bribing and lobbying might impact an economy by affecting the trust between the parties engaged in a contract. We proceeded by exploring the dynamics of effort allocation to productive and unproductive activities and the evolution of trust and reputation in an agent-based model where the terms of a contract could be violated by dishonest agents through rent-seeking activities.
Entities, state variables and scales
The model has three main components including players, links, and the reputation module.
The model starts with N initial players, where N > 3. Each player has two main characteristics including its effort allocation and risk-taking attitude (RTA). Effort allocation is represented as a dynamic-size bit vector where, for each bit, if it is 1, the agent will be allocating all his effort to productive purposes and so is called honest (H), and otherwise it presents rent-seeking behavior and acts dishonestly (D) in interactions through misallocation of effort to unproductive conduct. The number of bits in the vector is equal to the number of neighbors each agent has, since each bit represents a link to one neighbor. The risk-taking level is a normally distributed random variable between 0 and 1 which represents the agent's attitude in trust formation.
Links are the core of the model. During the linking process, agents connect to the agent closest to them which is not already one of their connected neighbors. When there is a link between two agents, it means that they can engage in one interaction per tick called a "contract". A contract is implemented using two separate weighted directed links in NetLogo, but for simplicity, in the model description we use the term "Link" to refer to both of them.
Each contract has a value called Income which shows the total amount of utility that can be gained from that contract. When two agents are involved in a contract they gain a share of that Income, which is accumulated every tick in a variable called Wealth.
The amount of Income for any contract is a function of the MutualTrust between two agents; when agents trust each other more, they are more likely to have contracts with higher possible incomes, whereas if the trust degrades, the income will decrease as well. This is implemented using a logistic function as Equation 1 where MutualTrust is the sum of agents' Trust of each other. As Trust is between 0 and 1 and MutualTrust is between 0 and 2, α = 7 so that Income is between 0 and 1. shares from the total possible income. 
For simplicity, in the majority of simulations we have considered that whenever both agents are honest, the income is divided equally between them, so HH1 and HH2 are equal to 0.5. In the other three cases, dishonest behavior in the form of violating the contract means that at least one agent is allocating effort to unproductive behavior, and so, following the rentseeking literature, since some resources are wasted, we assume that the total gain will be less than the maximum income. So HD1 + HD2, DH1 + DH2 and DD1 + DD2 are all less than 1.
Using the same logic, we usually expect DD1 + DD2 to be less than both HD1 + HD2 and DH1 + DH2. Also since being dishonest provides agents with an opportunity to have a higher share of the total income, HD1 is smaller than HD2 and DH1 is greater than DH2. Two sample IDTs are shown below. Each link between any two agents has its own IDT whose values can be produced randomly when the model initiates or can be made similar for all links. 
As can be seen in the tables above, not only have we allowed the DH and HD combinations to have asymmetric outputs, but the same feature is considered for HH and DD contracts. To implement that, we ensured that the contract Income is divided between the agents in correct order since NetLogo randomly calls the agents during the simulation.
When the contracts are concluded, each agent records all the gains separately for each link and also adds their gains to their wealth. In the next step of the function (but within the same time tick), they compare their outcome with the previous ones to find out if their current strategy has performed better and should be recorded for later optimization. The comparison is a cyclical procedure as shown in the pseudo code below in Box 1.
Here cycle is a counter for the iterations of the optimization process and max-cycle shows the length of each complete optimization round. If cycle is less than max-cycle, it is increased by 1 and the current value of gain for each link is added to the value of store for that link. These iterations continue until cycle reaches max-cycle. Then if the accumulated amount in each link's store is higher than its previous max-store, store is recorded as max-store and the current behavior type, H or D, is stored as the best type. Finally, store and cycle are both initiated to start a new round.
In the simulation, if an agent changes its type, from H to D or vice versa, both store and cycle are reset to ensure that their values always are associated with one specific type. Changes in value of max-cycle have been studied in the sensitivity analysis and are discussed in the next section. Also to avoid having an elephant memory embedded in the agents, we have added a factor to the algorithm, β, which is responsible for degrading the max-store value over time.
As β is between 0 and 1, it guarantees that agents do not lock in one particular value for maxstore. This provides better dynamics in the model by resembling a process which enables the agents to forget this value. During the Check procedure, two main functions are performed. Firstly, for each link, agents monitor each others' type, trying to investigate if the other agent has behaved dishonestly. If the other side of the link has been dishonest and the caller can recognize it based on its associated probability, the Agent decreases its trust to the other agent, otherwise it increases it. Agents decrease their trust based on (1 -RTA) which implies that the higher their risktaking the lower their trust decline if they discover dishonesty during a contract and increase their trust considering RTA so more risk-loving agents raise their trust more after experiencing a fair contract.
In the second part of Check, the links with Trust equal to or less than zero are broken and the violator agent is added to each agent's blacklist. The agent also invites its connected agents to decrease their trust of the violator based on their own (1 -RTA). The proportion of the decrease is simply calculated by multiplying their MutualTrust and the neighbor's RTA, then the amount is deducted from the current value of Trust.
Four different genetic operators are implemented in the code. Mutation guarantees that the agent changes its type over time (between Honest and Dishonest), looking for a type with higher return. The other three are all crossovers providing adaptation, learning and optimization. For crossovers, each agent takes into account the links' best-performing type, the best type among its links and also the best performing type of its connected agents. The rates at which agents adapt to any of these three are provided as inputs on the model interface. Finally each agent attempts to expand its social network to increase its income and wealth. During this step, agents select an agent which they are not already linked to and also is not on their blacklist. The new link can also be recommended by other agents whom the caller has a high trust of. As mentioned previously, blacklisting may not be permanent. In that case, the probability of a violator being removed from the blacklist is associated with an agent's RTA as it takes longer for agents with lower risk preferences to delete an entry from their list. The blacklist removal is a first-in first-out process. 
Design concepts
Considering the model's specifications and features, some of the main design concepts are introduced in this section.
Basic principles
While the model is based on the theory of effort allocation to incorporate an economic system, it takes a dynamic game theoretical approach to implement the micro-level interaction based on strategic decisions. The model also is enriched with a social network which not only serves as the infrastructure for agent-to-agent interactions, but since strategies can diffuse through the network, it can also be considered to be an adaptation framework.
Finally, the tagging system is embedded as an attempt to extend the agent's individual-level perception and decisions to the meso-level.
Emergence
Trust and Income both emerge from individual level interactions, since any decisions made by agents are not only affected by their individual features such as their RTAs, but also their social networks.
Adaptation
Beyond merely considering personal experiences, the agents also adapt their decisions by taking into account their social network. The adaptation to the experiences of other agents can be direct, for instance when the agent receives suggestions from others through the reputation system, or indirect as the strategy recommendation can transfer to not-directlyconnected agents via intermediate nodes.
Objectives
The main objective of the agents is to increase their Gain from each contract, which is their share from the maximum Income. This is subject to a trade-off as allocating all the effort to productive activities increases the MutualTrust but has a medium return in terms of personal
Gain. On the other hand unproductive efforts lead to higher returns, especially if the counterparty to the contract is honest and productive, but is likely to decrease the MutualTrust and so the maximum Income.
Learning
As mentioned previously, learning is implemented using four genetic operators and their associated occurrence probabilities including mutation, link-level crossover, agent-level crossover and network-level crossover.
Sensing
The agents sense the other agent's type, if their recognition probability condition is satisfied but they cannot identify its best type, Gain, Wealth or even the recognition strength. In other words, A may know whether B is honest or not, but A has no way of knowing how wealthy B really is. Agents can also sense some variables from their social network, such as the highest gaining type without discovering to whom that type belongs.
Interaction and Stochasticity
The details about the interaction procedure in the form of contracts were given in the first section and the sources of stochasticity in the model are presented in Table 2 .
Observation
The main observed variables include the trends of honest and dishonest behavior, the proportion of agents selecting each of the best types, the mean trust in the model, number of links, blacklists' sizes, broken and created links, agents' Wealth and links' Gains.
Sensitivity Analysis and Initialization
In order to decide on the initial conditions, we performed a sensitivity analysis (SA) over the main variables in the model. Table 3 shows the variables and their tested values. The above set of initial conditions results in more than 17,496 simulations which are run for 5000 ticks under five different random seeds (1 to 5). Figure 2 shows the distribution for mean Trust for a sample set of 8748 simulations under random seed = 1, covering all the combinations except for the initial type. If the mutation rate is proportionally higher than the crossover rates, it makes them ineffective and if crossovers are very frequent in relation to mutation, agents will be locked in one specific type of behavior, unable to adapt to changes in the other agents.
Finally, considering different combinations in the SA, the mutation rate is set to 0.001. Then the link-level crossover probability is 0.004 and for agent-level and network-level crossover probabilities it is 0.002. It means that on average, between every two mutations, the agents have eight opportunities to adapt. It also is a sensible choice considering the max-cycle, because on average, between every two operations, at least two full cycles are possible.
The final decision is about how frequently new links are created and how long agents keep a violator on their blacklist. As for the genetic operators, these two are associated as well.
According to the SA outputs, if the link creation rate is set to 0.001, the number of created links is almost equal to the number of broken links. As a result, this value keeps the number of links almost constant in the model. Considering this decision, the blacklist removal rate is set to 0.0002, so each violator is blocked for almost five new connections on average. The final selected initial conditions are presented in Table 4 . 
Results
Before presenting the results on how the IDT, RTA and different reputation module values can affect the model outputs, we illustrate how a single-run model evolves over time. Figure   3 shows a sample output for a run with 200,000 ticks based on the IDT presented in Table 5 . As can be seen, while overall Trust increases in the simulation, there were significant variations in its level, as the moving average clearly shows in the lower part of the figure.
The mean value for Trust is 0.043, the standard deviation is 0.0076 and skewness is equal to -0.47 representing the increasing trend.
The source of these variations can be partly traced to the proportion of agents who are honest or dishonest at any point of time. Figure 4 shows the trend for the proportion of agents who select each type over the simulation. The presence of different cycle lengths in the dataset shows that it is not directly produced by a single factor, but rather it has emerged from the model complexity. The important issue in the above figures is that while Trust is rising in the model, the type trends do not converge to a specific value but their cyclical behavior continues indefinitely.
This can be due to an increase in the average amount of Trust per link in trust clusters which are introduced later in this section. 
Changing the Income Distribution Tables (IDTs)
One of the main factors affecting agents' decisions is how the contract income is divided between two agents. This is a complex topic since not only it is associated with each agent's own type, but it is affected by how the counterparty to the contract responds. Firstly, we ran a set of experiments based on Table 6 . As can be seen in the table, we keep all the values fixed except for HH1 and HH2 which can be one of the numbers from (0 to 0.5 by 0.1) combined with a value from a similar array, resulting in 36 different combinations for (HH1, HH2). and DH2 is more than one in the rest of cases. The Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression results presented in Table 8 show that while the Gain of the honest agent impacts the results, the coefficients for the dishonest behavior are not significant. The upper mid-range R 2 in the results below is primarily due to the complexities embedded in the model through different feedback loops which decrease model sensitivity to the inputs. We finally ran a comprehensive simulation based on the IDT presented in Table 9 which covers all the eight type variables. The results for a linear OLS model are presented in Table 10 . We have also tested for possible non-linearity in the model but the produced coefficients are either non-significant. According to the results, two coefficients for DH2 and HD1, are significant at 95% level while the other six at 99%. Based on the estimated coefficients, the main factor which can increase trust in this model is ensuring that agents gain the maximum share of income in the HH interactions since the positive impacts of a HH type on trust is more 10 times higher than the negative effects from a DD type.
On the other side, agents decrease their trust more when they are honest and their partner is not, compared to the situation when they are both dishonest. Using stepwise selection and allsubset regression (stepAIC 1 and leaps 2 functions in R (R Development Team, 2011), we tried to discover any better possible combination of the explanatory variables with higher levels of 1 It calculates the Akaike information criterion for measuring the goodness of fit. Source: http://stat.ethz.ch/R-manual/R-devel/library/MASS/html/stepAIC.html 2 According to the documentation, leaps "performs an exhaustive search for the best subsets of the variables in x for predicting y in linear regression, using an efficient branch-and-bound algorithm." Source: http://cran.r-project.org/web/packages/leaps/leaps.pdf R 2 or statistical significance, but according to the results, the regression outcome presented in Table 10 is the best possible arrangement.
Changing the RTA
In order to create communities with low or high levels of RTA, we applied a Gamma distribution with the values presented in the Figure 5 . In each case, first the distribution is produced and then its output is divided by the maximum value to provide us with numbers between 0 and 1.
We also used two other distributions, one with a uniformly distributed RTA between 0 and 1, and the second one using a normal distribution, N (0.5. 0.15). In the normal distribution if the function produces values less than 0 or higher than 1, it is valued at 0.5. The applied IDT for the experiment is presented in Table 10 . First of all, as we expect, in models with higher risk-taking population, more links are preserved as less links are broken during the simulation. In the three modes with low risktaking, on average, around 30,000 links are cut, leading the model to end with 1.4 links per agent, while in the three risk-loving models, on average around 600 links connect the agents together at the end, around 10 times higher than the previous case.
RTA1: Gamma (2,2) RTA2: Gamma (3,2)
RTA3: Gamma (4,2) RTA4: Gamma (4,2) inverse RTA5: Gamma (3,2) inverse RTA6: Gamma (2,2) inverse In the results presented in Figure 6 , while increases in RTA lead to higher levels of Gain in the environment, the effects are not constant. Extremely high levels of RTA, for instance in the RTA6 from Figure 5 , can actually decrease the level of Gain, which can be due to the fact that extremely risk-loving agents engage in many sub-efficient contacts as they do not break their links with the violators. 
The Reputation Factor
The third part of results reports how changes in the reputation module affect the model outputs. In this section we designed four experiments based on the IDT in Table 12 . To achieve a more robust result, the model was run under 5 different random seeds, the clusters are identified under each seed value, and a pool of clusters is generated containing 500 agents distributed among 60 clusters. Then one cluster is selected randomly as the reference and all the others are compared to that one. According to the results, at least 30 clusters show statically significant differences when their mean is compared to the reference which has the average trust of 0.57. To ensure that this difference is not driven with the mean value of the reference, we manually give new mean values to the reference ranging between 0 and 1, as presented in Table 14 . As can be seen, with variations across the range, the differences in trust across the clusters are consistent. Removing the clusters with smaller number of agents results in the same findings. 
Conclusions
This study investigated how trust, as an emergent phenomenon, is associated with the microlevel decisions made by individuals. We presented an agent-based model that is able to capture some of the complexities involved in the formation and evolution of trust in an environment where agents can be productive or rent-seeking. This was by achieved by embedding different levels of adaptation, modeling feedback loops, applying a game theoretic interaction framework and taking an asymmetric approach toward information sharing and transfer.
The results suggest that in an environment with the features we have considered, the returns to being honest and productive in a contract play the most critical role in encouraging agents to avoid rent-seeking behavior such as lobbying and bribing. In other words, providing a fair and efficient business environment can motivate agents to avoid allocating effort to unproductive activities to increase their gain. The results also show that the trust decreases that result from an honest agent encountering a dishonest agent are greater than the positive impacts that an honest individual can have on a dishonest one. In other words, the negative impacts of rent-seeking behavior on the economic output through the trust link can be higher than the direct waste of resources which are allocated to unproductive activities, since the net impact of an interaction between an honest and a dishonest agent is more likely to encourage the honest one to allocate further effort to rent-seeking. As we also presented in the findings, this may even be amplified through clusters of rent-seeking which form across the network.
We also discussed the fact that while higher levels of risk-taking can lead to more productive allocation and Gain in contracts, the relationship is non-linear, so risk-loving agents may engage in any kind of interaction without being cautious about the inefficiencies. This behavior, as in real life, can result in reductions in both their Trust and their Gain and has been verified empirically by studies such as by Roth (2009) who concludes that a curvilinear relationship exists between trust and economic growth.
This model can be extended by calibrating its mechanisms against real-world trends of trust across communities with different cultural and business environments and by trying to discover specific simulation setups which can reproduce the evolution of trust in actual economic networks such as supply chains and manufacturing networks.
